The Southeast U.S.A. Shrimp Industry: Issues Related to Trade and Antidumping Duties by Keithly, Walter R., Jr. & Poudel, Pawan
459
Marine Resource Economics, Volume 23, pp. 459–483 0738-1360/00 $3.00 + .00
Printed in the U.S.A. All rights reserved Copyright © 2008 MRE Foundation, Inc.
The Southeast U.S.A. Shrimp Industry:
Issues Related to Trade and Antidumping Duties
WALTER R. KEITHLY, JR.
PAWAN POUDEL
Louisiana State University
Abstract   On December 31, 2003 a coalition representing Southeast U.S.A.
shrimp harvesters and processors filed a petition with the U.S. International
Trade Administration and the U.S. International Trade Commission seeking re-
lief in the form of antidumping duties from what the coalition perceived as
unfair trade practices by six countries—China, Vietnam, India, Thailand, Ecua-
dor, and Brazil. After an exhaustive investigation, an affirmative finding of
dumping and injury was found, and duties were imposed on subject merchandise
from these six countries. This study examines the factors that led to the petition
being filed, the investigation process, and the outcome associated with the im-
position of antidumping duties. Overall, the study concludes that while the
duties resulted in a limited amount of trade deflection, particularly among those
countries assessed with higher duties, much of the protective effect that might
have been forthcoming from restricting imports from the six named countries
was eroded by trade diversion to countries not included in the petition.
Key words   Antidumping duties, shrimp, trade, United States of America.
JEL Classification Codes F13, Q17.
Introduction
World exports of shrimp, valued at $10.9 billion, constituted more than 15% of the
2003 $63 billion international trade market in fisheries commodities (FAO 2007).
Trade in shrimp has expanded significantly since the early 1980s in response to both
an increase in world production of the commodity, especially cultured activities, and
to favorable economic conditions. As world exports of fresh and frozen shrimp ex-
panded from 897 million pounds in 1980 to 4.1 billion pounds in 2003, the deflated
price of the exported product fell from $3.22 per product-weight pound to $1.47 per
pound (derived from FAO 2007).1
The United States of America, while a major producer of shrimp, is also the
world’s largest importer. In conjunction with the increasing import base and decline
in world market price, the price paid to U.S. shrimp fishermen (i.e., the real
dockside price) has gradually been declining since the early 1980s. The Southeast
U.S.A. (the coastal states extending from North Carolina through Texas) harvesting
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sector, unable to make the adjustments needed, has frequently requested relief from
the perceived problems associated with the growing import base and the resulting
suppression in dockside prices.
On December 31, 2003 a coalition of Southeast U.S.A. shrimp producers and
processors filed a petition with the U.S. Department of Commerce (USDOC) and the
U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) alleging that six countries—China,
Vietnam, India, Thailand, Ecuador, and Brazil—were unfairly ‘dumping’ product on
the U.S. market. After a one-year investigation, a finding of dumping and injury to
the domestic industry by means of dumping was affirmed. Antidumping duties,
varying greatly by country, were established accordingly.
While other components of the U.S. seafood industry (e.g., catfish, salmon, and
crawfish), have, in the past, requested relief from the perceived problems associated
with the growing import base and the resulting suppression in dockside prices, these
requests were relatively limited in scope when compared to the request brought
forth by the shrimp industry.2 For example, previous U.S. seafood antidumping peti-
tions targeted only one country, whereas the shrimp antidumping petition targeted
six countries.3 Similarly, while the number of different products included in previ-
ous petitions tended to be limited (e.g., catfish fillets from Vietnam, crawfish tail
meat from China), the number of products included in the U.S. shrimp antidumping
petition, while not all inclusive, was large in scope. Finally, with respect to the three
previous investigations—catfish, crawfish, and salmon—the number of countries
producing a product that might compete in the U.S. market with the country being
targeted in the investigation was limited. Though six countries were targeted in the
shrimp antidumping petition, there are at least 20 other countries which produced
sizeable amounts of warm-water shrimp at the time of the investigation, and much
of the production from these countries entered the world trade market. Hence, prod-
uct from these countries could, potentially, be diverted to the U.S. market if the
trade flow to the U.S.A. among the six targeted countries was interrupted as a result
of duties imposed on the six named countries.
The overall goals of this article are to examine those factors that culminated in
the U.S. shrimp industry filing an antidumping petition on December 31, 2003 and
the impacts associated with the subsequent imposition of duties on the six named
countries. To achieve these goals, the article proceeds as follows. First, a brief re-
view of relevant antidumping literature is presented. Then, the world shrimp supply,
trade, and impacts of U.S. imports on the Southeast U.S.A. dockside shrimp price
are briefly reviewed. Attention is then turned to a review of previous attempts to
limit U.S. shrimp imports, the most recent attempt, and an analysis of why the out-
come of the most recent investigation differed from outcomes of previous
investigations. After reviewing some issues of relevance to the current antidumping
investigation, the impacts associated with the investigation and subsequent imposi-
tion of duties on subject merchandise from the targeted countries is analyzed. The
final section presents some concluding remarks.
Review of Antidumping Literature
As indicated by Malhotra, Rus, and Kassam (2008), there is a relatively large body
of literature examining the effectiveness of antidumping investigations on trading
2 A review of the two U.S. trade disputes involving salmon is presented by Asche (1997) and Asche,
Bjørndal, and Sissener (2003).
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patterns for an importing country. Much of the literature focuses on two central
themes. The first theme is whether antidumping measures result in a reduction in
imports among the targeted countries (generally referred to as the ‘named’ coun-
tries). This issue is generally referred to as trade ‘deflection.’ The second theme is
whether decreases in supply among named countries are partially or totally offset by
increases in supply by non-named countries (generally referred to as trade diver-
sion).
In addition to these two themes, two other issues have been receiving increased
attention. The first issue is whether the initiation of an antidumping investigation
can have an impact on imports, even prior to when a decision is made. This issue is
generally referred to as the ‘harassment effect.’ The second issue relates to whether
affirmative dumping findings are ‘tied’ to macroeconomic conditions in the country
seeking relief and whether the filings of antidumping petitions are purposely timed
to better ensure an affirmative finding and higher duties.
In general, most studies analyzing the issue of trade deflection have found sub-
stantial declines in the volume of trade from those countries named in the petition
with ‘high’ duties being particularly effective (e.g., Staiger and Wolak 1994; Prusa
1997, 2001; Malhotra, Rus, and Kassam 2008). For example, Malhotra, Rus, and
Kassam, whose analysis is limited to U.S. imports of agricultural commodities (and
thus is likely to be most relevant to the shrimp antidumping petition), found “an ex-
tremely significant impact of antidumping duties on imports from countries named
in the petition” and also found that the magnitude was quite high. Specifically, in
the first year subsequent to an affirmative action being given and duties imposed,
imports from named countries were found to decline by about 60%. Duties were also
found to significantly restrict imports in the following years.
With respect to the issue of trade diversion, studies provide somewhat more
‘mixed’ results. As noted by Malhotra, Rus, and Kassam (2008), for example, Prusa
(1997, 2001) found a significant amount of trade diversion toward non-named coun-
tries in association with petitions filed by the U.S. manufacturing sector.4
Significant trade diversion suggests, of course, that protection afforded to the do-
mestic industry via antidumping duties may be limited.5 In an analysis of
antidumping petitions filed by the U.S. agricultural sector, however, Malhotra, Rus,
and Kassam (2008) found no significant trade diversion, suggesting that trade de-
flecting resulting from an affirmative finding of dumping may have a longer lasting
protective effect on the U.S. agriculture sector than any protective effect associated
with affirmative findings related to manufacturing products.
As discussed by Prusa (2001), the harassment effect associated with antidump-
ing investigations is the result of two factors. First, during the investigation period,
temporary duties are levied on subject merchandise included in the scope of investi-
gation.6 Second, uncertainty related to the outcome of the investigation results in a
stifling effect. Prusa (2001), for example, found a significant harassment effect, re-
gardless of whether duties were subsequently levied. In their study of antidumping
4 As noted by Malhotra, Rus, and Kassam (2008), the studies by Prusa actually cover all products, but
since 80% of all petitions filed in the U.S.A. are by the manufacturing sector, this sector drives the re-
sults.
5 In his 1997 study, for example, Prusa found that increased imports from non-named countries offset
any decrease in imports among named countries within a six-year period. In his 2001 study, Prusa found
that for affirmative decisions, imports by non-named countries increased by 16% in the first year after
the investigation and by 45% by the third year.
6 If, during the period of investigation, named countries are found not to be increasing exports to the
country in question as a means of circumventing any subsequent duties that would be levied on the
product (assuming an affirmative finding), the duties collected during the period of investigation are re-
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duties in the U.S. agriculture sector, Malhotra, Rus, and Kassam observed no harass-
ment effect.
The U.S. antidumping laws are administered by both the USDOC and the
USITC. In the first stage, the USDOC determines the existence and the degree to
which dumping is occurring (i.e., “unfair” pricing). As noted by Prusa (2001), the
finding by the USDOC of “unfair” pricing has been the norm since 1980, with a
negative finding being reached in less than 5% of the cases being brought before the
agency. While the finding of unfair pricing by the USDOC is the norm, the finding
of material injury to the domestic industry by the USITC is less certain.7 However,
the finding of material injury has been clearly linked to the macroeconomic condi-
tions of the domestic economy (see Knetter and Prusa 2003) and Feinberg (2005)
has recently provided evidence that petitioners have, since the mid-1980s, become
increasingly sophisticated in timing the petition to increase the probability of receiv-
ing a favorable outcome from the USITC.
World Supply, Trade, and Impacts on Domestic Prices
World Shrimp Production
Shrimp production, as with many other seafood commodities, is a combination of
wild harvest and farming activities. Estimated total annual shrimp production (i.e.,
captured and farmed product) throughout the world, as indicated in figure 1,8 in-
creased from 3.4 billion pounds (live weight) in 1980 to 13.4 billion pounds by
2005. Overall, the increase in world shrimp production during the 1980 through
2005 period translates into a growth rate of more than 400 million pounds per year.
To place this annual growth rate into perspective, the annual Southeast U.S.A.
shrimp harvest generally falls within the relatively narrow range of 220 million
pounds to 280 million pounds (live weight).9 Hence, annual growth in world produc-
tion of warm-water shrimp has, in the long run, exceeded total Southeast U.S.A.
production.
Much of the growth in world warm-water shrimp production since the 1980s has
been the result of successful farming activities. World production of warm-water
farmed shrimp in 1980 equaled 160 million pounds, which accounted for approxi-
mately 5% of total production at the time (figure 1). By 2005, farmed production
had advanced to about 5.9 billion live-weight pounds, or almost 45% of total world
warm-water shrimp output.
While an increase in the world culture production is evident throughout the pe-
riod of study, growth has been particularly pronounced since the mid- to late-1990s.
For example, cultured production in 1997 equaled 2.1 billion pounds (live weight).
By 2003, it had more than doubled to 4.7 billion pounds and increased again to 5.9
billion pounds in 2005.
Asia, whose farmed shrimp production advanced from 135 million pounds (live
7 For example, Prusa (2001) found that a finding of material injury was negative among approximately
one-half of the cases brought before the USITC since 1980.
8 All data on world shrimp production is derived from the FAO (2007) Fisheries Global Aquaculture
Production and Global Capture Production databases. Production of Akiimi Paste is excluded from cap-
tured estimates since this product is low valued and generally does not enter the world trade market.
9 The Southeast U.S.A. shrimp species are short lived, and the population in any given year is generally
thought to be independent of the level of effort in previous years. Furthermore, variations in annual har-
vests are considered to be primarily related to changes in environmental conditions that affect stock size
rather than changes in effort.Antidumping Duties and Impacts on Shrimp Trade 463
weight) in 1980 to 5.3 billion pounds in 2005, has accounted for the vast majority of
growth in aquaculture production and currently accounts for almost 90% of the total.
Cultured production in South America, which increased from 22 million pounds in
1980 to 360 million pounds in 2005, represents about 7% of the world total. Finally,
cultured production in Central America advanced from less than 1 million pounds in
1980 to 245 million pounds in 2005.
World Shrimp Exports
World exports of shrimp, which equaled about 900 million pounds in 1980, more
than quadrupled to 4.9 billion pounds by 2005 (figure 2). After adjusting for infla-
tion, the value of world shrimp trade more than doubled from $2.9 billion to $6.5
billion during the period. The increase in deflated value is substantially less than the
430% increase in export quantity, suggesting a sharp decline in the real (i.e., de-
flated) price of the exported product. Overall, the $1.31 price of the exported
product in 2005 reflects more than a 50% decline from the $3.17 per pound price in
1980 (figure 2). As indicated, the real price of the exported product fell sharply dur-
ing the early-1980s before stabilizing at approximately $2.25–$2.50 per pound
during mid-1980s through 1997 period. Since 1997, however, prices have fallen
sharply. This most recent period of declining export prices coincides with the period
of significantly higher cultured shrimp production. Given the relatively high in-
creases in world income since the mid-1990s, the recent decline in price tends to
suggest that growth in shrimp supply has exceeded the growth in demand, resulting
in a downward pressure on the real price.10 This is common with other successful
Figure 1.  Annual World Shrimp Production (live weight), 1980–2005
Source: FAO (2007).
10 As discussed below, while world income has increased substantially since the mid-1990s, the primary
importers of shrimp include the U.S.A. and Japan. Income growth in Japan since the mid-1990s has been
very erratic and relatively low.Keithly and Poudel 464
aquaculture species, as numerous studies have indicated that productivity growth
seems to be the main driver for the increased production (e.g., Asche 1997; Asche,
Bjørndal, and Young 2001; Guttormsen 2002; Anderson 2002).
Increased shrimp harvest, both wild and cultured, has, of course, allowed for
more product to enter the international trade market. However, it is important to rec-
ognize that the increasing trade flow reflects not just increased production in total,
but also the source (i.e., farmed production versus wild production) of the increased
output. As noted by Csavas (1994), farm-raised shrimp is of greater importance than
wild product in world trade. Reasons cited by the author include: (i) farm-raised
product has greater ‘freshness’ than wild product; (ii) farmed product is less sea-
sonal in nature and, hence, more reliable than the wild counterpart; (iii) species and
sizes can be controlled better in the farm-based system than the wild-based system;
and (iv) the current trends in vertical integration of the farming system lend them-
selves to better adaptation to consumer needs.
While the primary exporters of shrimp are many and have changed substantially
over time, two countries, the U.S.A and Japan, have long dominated the import mar-
ket. These two countries combined have historically accounted for upwards of 50%
of the world shrimp imports by value. The European Union (E.U.) represents a sig-
nificant portion of the remaining import market; particularly if limited to
warm-water shrimp trade.
Figure 2.  Annual World Shrimp Exports (product weight)
and Deflated Export Price, 1980–2005
Source: FAO (2007).Antidumping Duties and Impacts on Shrimp Trade 465
U.S. Imports: A Closer Look
Annual U.S. shrimp imports, expressed on a headless, shell-on equivalent weight
basis, increased by a factor of five during the period of analysis ending in 2006,
from about 260 million pounds to 1.7 billion pounds (figure 3).11 During the early
1980s, Central America constituted the dominant seller of shrimp to the U.S. mar-
ket, accounting for approximately one-half of total U.S. imports, while South
America and Asia, with equal shares, accounted for most of the remaining imports.
As Ecuador’s cultured shrimp industry developed rapidly during the early- to mid-
1980s, growth in U.S. imports largely reflected increased Ecuadorian product. As
Asian cultured activities expanded rapidly after the mid-1980s, however, most of the
growth in U.S. imports has reflected increased Asian production. By 1997, the Cen-
tral American share of the total had fallen to about 25%, while the Asian share had
increased to almost 50%. With the large growth in Asian cultured shrimp production
since the mid-1990s, the Asian share increased to 70% by 2003 and approached 75%
of the total in 2006. Similarly, with growth in South American culture activities, ex-
ports from South America to the U.S.A. increased from less than 50 million pounds
in the early 1980s to 190 million pounds in 1997, with exports from Ecuador repre-
senting most of the expansion. All of the major Asian exporting countries produce
significant amounts of cultured shrimp (e.g., Thailand, Vietnam, India), and the larg-
est South American exporter, Ecuador, is also a major cultured shrimp producer.12 It
Figure 3.  Annual U.S. Shrimp Imports (headless, shell-on equivalent weight)
and Deflated Import Price, 1980–2006
Source: USDOC (various years).
11 U.S. import data are derived from USDOC (various issues). Imports, expressed on a product weight
basis, were converted to head-off equivalent weight based on the following conversions: breaded 0.63;
shell-on 1.0; peeled raw 1.28; other 0.57.Keithly and Poudel 466
is safe to say that the vast majority of the increasing U.S. import base since the mid-
1980s constitutes cultured shrimp.
Given the relatively high proportion of shrimp exports destined for the U.S.
market, one would anticipate a close relationship between the world export price
and the U.S. import price. This is confirmed by a comparison of the relevant infor-
mation in figure 2 (i.e., the world export price) and figure 3 (i.e., the U.S. import
price). Since the U.S. import price is expressed on a headless, shell-on equivalent
weight basis, whereas the world export price is expressed on a product weight basis,
one would expect the former to be somewhat lower than the later. This is generally
the case.
In addition to the increasing import base, the composition of imports has been
changing. Specifically, value-added products, particularly peeled products, have
been representing an increasing share of total imports. In 1980, for example, head-
less shell-on imports, equaling 139 million pounds, constituted 63% of total U.S.
imports, expressed on a product-weight basis (figure 4).13 Peeled product (raw and
other), equaling 76 million pounds (product weight) and representing 35% of total
imports by product weight, accounted for almost all of the remaining imports.
Breaded imports represented the remaining 2%. While imports of headless, shell-on
product increased throughout the period of analysis to 565 million pounds in 2006,
its share fell to 42% of total imports (product weight). By comparison, the share of
the total import base represented by peeled product (raw and other) increased to al-
most 50%. Breaded imports, which were negligible throughout the 1990s, accounted
for 8% of total U.S. shrimp imports in 2006 by product weight.
In general, while there has been steady growth in peeled product during 1980–
2006, the growth since the mid- to late-1990s can be described as ‘explosive.’
Specifically, U.S. imports of peeled shrimp advanced from 300 million pounds in
1997 to 540 million pounds in 2003 (product weight), or by almost 80%, before in-
creasing another 80 million pounds to 623 million pounds in 2006. As discussed
below, the changing import composition has significant ramifications with respect to
processing activities being conducted in the Southeast U.S.A. and in the success of
the anti-dumping petition filed at the end of 2003.
Impact on Domestic Price
In general, the Southeast U.S.A. deflated dockside shrimp price, which closely mir-
rors the import price, can be segmented into three relatively well-defined time
periods; the 1980s, the 1990s, and post 2000. During the early-1980s, the deflated
dockside price initially advanced from about $2.70 per pound in 1980–81 to $3.40
per pound in 1982–83 (figure 5). With the initial increase of Ecuadorian cultured
product entering the U.S. market, followed soon thereafter by Asian product, the de-
flated dockside price fell sharply and equaled only $2.10 per pound in 1989. Despite
continued increases in U.S. imports during the 1990s, the growth in U.S. demand re-
sulted in a relatively stable deflated dockside price.
Equaling $2.10 in 2000, the deflated dockside price then dropped precipitously
with the 2003 price ($1.26 per pound) equaling only 60% of that observed just four
years earlier. This decline coincided with a period of rapidly increasing cultured
12 U.S. shrimp imports are not recorded by type (i.e., cultured versus wild). However, it is probably safe
to assume that most U.S. imports from some countries, such as Thailand and Ecuador, are of a cultured
nature, even though these countries also produce sizeable amounts of wild shrimp (see Csavas [1994]
for details).
13 Small amounts of canned product are not included in this figure and discussion.Antidumping Duties and Impacts on Shrimp Trade 467
Figure 4.  Annual U.S. Shrimp Imports by Product Form, 1980–2006
Source, USDOC (various years).
shrimp production and, for reasons outlined in greater detail below, exceedingly
rapid growth in U.S. imports. Finally, the deflated dockside price has remained rela-
tively stable since 2003.
While the Southeast U.S.A. deflated dockside shrimp price has fallen rapidly
since the 1980s, output, in the long run, has remained unchanged (figure 5). As a result,
the deflated revenues generated from the fishery have fallen significantly, resulting
in a significant amount of exit from both the harvesting and processing sectors.
Attempts to Limit Imports
Initial Attempts
The first serious attempt to limit imports occurred in 1975 when the USITC, through
the public hearing process, reacted to a petition filed by the National Shrimp Con-
gress. The subsequent hearing investigation in 1976 sought to determine whether
shrimp products identified in item 114.45 of the Tariff Schedules of the U.S.A were
being imported in quantities that caused serious injury to the domestic shrimp indus-
try. The analysis and public testimony resulted in a finding of serious injury to the
domestic capture fishery. Adjustment assistance permitted under Title II of the Trade
Act was approved to allow shrimp-boat operators to obtain loans or loan guarantees.
This action, it was reasoned, would help domestic shrimp fishermen become com-
petitive with foreign producers. This initial investigation and subsequent action, one
should note, occurred before cultured shrimp production became a significant factor.
Approximately five years later, it was pointed out that the adjustment assistance
permitted under Title II of the Trade Act had actually failed to provide a remedy. In
response, a bill was sponsored in the U.S. Congress to formulate policy, including a
temporary quota combined with a 30% ad valorem tariff, to provide for domesticKeithly and Poudel 468
shrimp industry protection. Although the bill failed to receive the support necessary
for passage, it was significant because it was introduced at the time when cultured
shrimp was becoming an increasingly significant factor and because attention was
focused on the harvesting sector.
The focus remained on the shrimp harvesting sector when, in 1985, the USITC
again evaluated the shrimp import situation. Renewed supply increases, primarily
from cultured activities, were being experienced.14 The frequent forecasts of over-
seas successes of shrimp-farming companies were becoming a reality. The prospect
of additional shrimp farming successes in Central America, South America, and Asia
loomed on the business horizon. In explaining the situation to the USITC, the South-
east U.S.A. shrimp harvesters claimed: (i) that harvesting businesses were being
injured as a result of imports, and (ii) that shrimp industries in foreign countries
were benefiting from government assistance, which was artificially allowing their
product to be more competitive in the U.S. market (USITC 1985). Following a staff
review of the information and a public hearing, the USITC chose only to issue a re-
port rather than to recommend any remedies.
The impetus for trade investigations for shrimp, as noted, emanated from the
Southeast U.S.A. harvesting sector. Other components in the industry, most notably
the processing sector, did not actively pursue import restraints. This leads one to
speculate that domestic processors were, at a minimum, not being negatively im-
pacted from the increasing imports and may have, in fact, been benefiting. Analyses
by Roberts, Keithly, and Adams (1992) and Keithly and Roberts (1995) suggest that
14 For example, Ecuador’s exports to the U.S.A. nearly doubled during the 1980–84 period before falling
marginally in 1985. Similarly, Asian exports nearly tripled from 46 million pounds to 121 million
pounds.
Figure 5.  Southeast U.S.A. Shrimp Landings (headless weight)
and Deflated Price, 1980–2006
Source: USDOC (various years).Antidumping Duties and Impacts on Shrimp Trade 469
in the 1980s and early 1990s, imported product was frequently used in domestic pro-
cessing activities including those two products generally considered to be derived
from domestic input; i.e., headless, shell-on product and peeled raw product.
Most Recent Attempt
There was little concerted effort by the domestic shrimp industry to limit imports
during the 1990s. As the dockside price began to rapidly erode beginning in late
2001, however, the domestic industry began to organize and start a “war chest” for
likely litigation proceedings.
At the end of 2003, the Southern Shrimp Alliance (SSA), a coalition of shrimp
producers in eight southern states, filed a petition with the USDOC and the
USITC.15 The petition alleged that six countries—Brazil, Ecuador, India, Thailand,
Vietnam, and China—were ‘dumping’ excess production in the U.S. market in order
to increase their respective shares. After an initial finding of dumping by the
USDOC, the USITC confirmed that dumping was occurring and set duties accord-
ingly.16 The scope of the order included certain warm-water shrimp and prawns,
whether frozen, wild-caught or farm-raised, head-on or head-off, deveined or not
deveined, cooked or raw, or otherwise processed in frozen form.
While relatively complete, a number of products were not included in the scope
of the order (i.e., subject to duty). Excluded products include the following: (i)
breaded shrimp and prawns; (ii) shrimp and prawns generally classified in the
Pandalidae family and commonly referred to as cold-water shrimp, in any state of
processing; (iii) fresh shrimp and prawns whether shell-on or peeled; (iv) dried
shrimp and prawns and shrimp and prawns in prepared meals; (v) canned shrimp and
prawns; and (vi) certain dusted shrimp.
Of these excluded items, breaded shrimp, cold-water shrimp, and fresh shrimp
were excluded from the original scope of merchandise covered by the investigation.
Cold-water shrimp was excluded because it constitutes a very small portion of total
U.S. imports (less than 5%) and because substitution of cold-water shrimp for
warm-water shrimp is limited. Similarly, fresh shrimp imports have historically been
negligible and were therefore excluded from the scope of investigation.17 Breaded
shrimp was excluded from the scope of investigation because it is of little or no rel-
evance to the shrimp harvested in the U.S.A. Specifically, breaders have historically
sourced their shrimp inputs overseas and purchase only minimal shrimp from do-
mestic fishermen.18 As importers, the interests of the breading industry were adverse
to the interests of the industry utilizing domestic shrimp and, as such, breaders
would oppose the imposition of duties. As petitioners, the domestic shrimp industry
controlled the scope of the investigation and, as such, the scope was written to ex-
clude breaders.
Unlike breaded, cold-water, and fresh shrimp, canned shrimp was included in
the scope of investigation. After investigation, however, the USITC concluded that
imported like product (i.e., canned shrimp) was not causing material injury to that
15 More accurately, the petition was filed by the Ad Hoc Shrimp Trade Action Committee, the Versaggi
Shrimp Corporation, and the Indian Ridge Shrimp Company.
16 Details of this petition, including a chronology of events leading the USITC’s findings, can be found
in USITC (2005).
17 A request was subsequently made to expand the scope of investigation to include fresh shrimp, but the
USDOC declined to do so.
18 Keithly and Roberts (1995) reported that virtually all Southeast U.S.A. breading activities utilized im-
ported product as inputs in the production process.Keithly and Poudel 470
domestic segment of the industry, which consisted of a single producer, and, hence,
excluded that product from the scope of order.
Of the products excluded from the scope of order, the product generating the
most controversy was “dusted” shrimp.19 While included in the initial investigation,
the USDOC excluded the product in the final determination, despite petitioner’s ob-
jections.20 In non-technical terms, ‘dusting’ refers to the addition of a thin coating of
rice or wheat flour to the peeled shrimp product with the non-shrimp content consti-
tuting between 4% and 10% of the end product weight. Imports of this product prior
to the period of investigation were negligible, and petitioners argued that excluding
dusted shrimp from the scope of order (i.e., duties) would open a “loophole” whereby
importers could import the non-duty product and remove the coating after importing as a
means of circumventing any anti-dumping duties.21 Based on expert opinion, however,
the USDOC concluded that “removal of the dusting layer would be costly, time con-
suming and fatal to the quality of the product” (p. 6). Given that “dusted shrimp is
comprised of components that create clear physical characteristics that separate
dusted shrimp from subject merchandise” and the change in physical characteristics
to the raw product does not encourage removal of the coating after importation, the
USDOC made a determination in the final stage of the investigation that dusted
shrimp fell outside the scope of investigation and, hence, not subject to duty.
Why Was the Petition Successful?
As discussed, U.S. antidumping laws are administered by both the USDOC and the
USITC. In the first stage, the USDOC determines the existence and the degree to
which dumping is occurring (i.e., “unfair” pricing), and the finding of “unfair” pric-
ing by the USDOC is the norm. The paucity of negative findings is expected given
that “[t]he rules governing how the Department of Commerce calculates dumping
margins are widely considered biased in favour of finding positive margins” (Prusa
2001, p. 598). The rules, as outlined by Elwell (2004), specify a hierarchy of meth-
ods. Preference is to be given to establishing a home market index which can be
used to compare the price of the product being sold in its home market to the price
with the alleged dumping price in the U.S.A. If home market sales are less than 5%
of sales in the U.S. market, however, then a third country index, which relates the
product price in another of the exporter’s foreign markets to the alleged dumping
price in the U.S. market, becomes the preferred method for determining the exist-
ence and degree of dumping. Finally, in lieu of a home market index or a third
country index, an index that attempts to measure the cost of production (including a
normal rate of return), termed a constructed value index, is created. There is a con-
siderable amount of latitude as to how this index can be created, including the use of
data from surrogate countries.22 As such, they are considered to be subject to sub-
stantial measurement error (Elwell 2004).
19 Dusted shrimp had not been well defined at the initial stage of the investigation and the USDOC,
while including it within the scope of investigation, indicated that dusted shrimp might be excluded in
the final determination. Since the product was not well defined, the USDOC solicited comments as to
the appropriate definition. It accepted a definition proposed by two companies (Long John Silver’s Inc.
and Eastern Fish Company). This definition led the USDOC to conclude that the amount of transforma-
tion to the product made it excludable from the scope of investigation.
20 A detailed discussion regarding exclusion of this product is presented in United States Court of Inter-
national Trade (2007).
21 Henderson (2007) provides an interesting review of the issue.
22 In theory, the surrogate country is determined in terms of having a comparable economy and being a
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China and Vietnam are considered non-market economies and, hence, these two
countries were considered separately in establishing duty rates. Since the govern-
ments of these two non-market economies were considered to control prices and
costs, information provided by these countries was considered unreliable and, as
such, the USDOC chose to develop constructed value indices. In the case of China,
the surrogate country used to determine the dumping margin was India, while the
surrogate country selected for Vietnam was Bangladesh.23 For China, final estimated
margins, as determined by the USDOC, ranged from 27.9% to 84.9% among named
exporters found to be selling in the U.S. market at less than fair market value (one
company was found not to be selling at below fair market value) and from 55.2% to
112.8% among non-named exporters.24 For Vietnam, the final estimated margins
ranged from 4.1% to 25.8% among named exporters and either 4.4% or 25.8%
among non-named exporters (with the lower rate being given to those exporters who
were able to demonstrate that they were not subject to government control in pricing
activities).
Three of the market-based economies targeted in the antidumping petition—Ec-
uador, Thailand, and India—tended to fare much better than the two non-market
based economies. Final estimated margins among Ecuadorian-named exporters
ranged from 2.3% to 4.5%. The estimated margin for non-named Ecuadorian export-
ers equaled 3.3%. For Thailand, estimated margins across both named and
non-named exporters fell in a narrow range that averaged about 6%, and the esti-
mated margin for Indian exporters averaged approximately 10%. Unlike the other
market-based economies listed in the petition, final estimated margins for Brazilian
exporters were more in line with those of the two non-market economies. Among
named Brazilian exporters, estimated final margins ranged from about 10% to al-
most 70% and 10.4% among the non-named exporters.
As noted, the SSA filed dumping actions on December 31, 2003. Filing before
the end of the year was, to some extent, a tactical measure that allowed the SSA to
use firm-level data for the years that the commercial fishing and processing sectors
exhibited large financial losses.25 Based upon responses from a survey administered
by the USITC, it was concluded that operating margins to vessel owners (prior to
subtraction of salaries) fell from 1.4% in 2001 to negative 9.8% in 2002 before re-
covering marginally to negative 6.6% in 2003. Similarly, while 65% of the domestic
processors reported positive operating margins in 2001, more than one-half of the
respondents reported operating losses in 2002 and 2003.
Given macro-economic conditions and changes in the international shrimp situ-
ation, the finding of large losses to the domestic harvesting and processing sectors
was a foregone conclusion. Interrupting 10 years of solid growth, the U.S.A. entered
a recession in March, 2001. The decline in economic activities was further under-
mined by the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack. Given that shrimp is largely
consumed in the away-from-home market, which is strongly tied to economic condi-
tions, the domestic events during 2001 undoubtedly resulted in a reduction in U.S.
shrimp demand. By itself, this factor would likely have resulted in a significant de-
23 For a discussion of the rationale for the choice of these surrogate countries, see Federal Register (Vol.
69, No. 235, December 8, 2004).
24 The lower margin (i.e., duty) of 55.2% was imposed on companies that could demonstrate that they
were not subject to government control, while the higher rate of 112.8% was imposed on all other non-
named companies.
25 In addition, the state of Louisiana had pledged $600 thousand to the law firm that eventually repre-
sented the Southern Shrimp Alliance (SSA) in the anti-dumping petition contingent on a December 15
filing deadline. The state indicated that if that deadline was not met, the money would instead be given
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cline in the domestic dockside price; hence negatively influencing profitability in
the harvesting sector.
The U.S. recession, however, coincided with a number of other events that re-
sulted in “record” increases in exports of shrimp to the U.S. market during the early-
to mid-2000s. First, as noted, cultured shrimp was expanded rapidly from 2000 to
2003 (roughly the period of investigation), increasing from 2.2 billion pounds (live
weight) to 4.0 billion pounds. While much of the increased production would nor-
mally have been directed to all three of the primary export markets—the U.S.A,
Japan, and the E.U.—Japan, like the U.S.A., was entering a recession in the early
2000s and Japan absorbed none of the increased production.26 Two factors in the
E.U.—Thailand’s changing Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) in the E.U.
and antibiotics—also led to diversion of export product from Asia to the U.S. mar-
ket. As discussed by Debaere (2005), under the auspices of the GSP the E.U. has
historically granted concessions on tariff rates to developing countries. In the 1996
regular review of the GSP, the E.U. announced that Thailand’s GSP benefits for
shrimp would be phased out through 1999 and discontinued thereafter.27 Analysis by
Debaere (2005) concluded that the retraction of Thailand’s GSP status resulted in a
significant trade diversion of Thai product from the E.U. to the U.S. market.
Similarly, analysis by Debaere (2005) concluded that “differences in food and
safety standards” between the E.U. and the U.S.A. also contributed to significant
trade diversion of East Asian product from the E.U. market to the U.S. market. In
mid- to late-2001, specifically, reports began to surface in Europe that high levels of
two antibiotics—chloramphenicol and nitrofurans—were being found in shipments
of shrimp from East Asia (primarily China, Vietnam, and Thailand) to the European
market. Both the E.U. and the U.S.A. maintain a zero tolerance for these two antibi-
otics because they may be harmful to humans. While both of these countries
(regions) maintain a zero tolerance policy, differences existed in both detection
methods and enforcement policy. For example, the E.U. utilized technology that al-
lowed detection of between 0.1 and 0.3 parts per billion, while the U.S.A. initially
used technology that would allow detection of 0.5 parts per billion. Similarly, to
prevent contamination in the food chain, the E.U. placed a temporary ban on product
coming from some countries (i.e., China and Vietnam) and subjected almost all of
the Thai imports to inspection during the height of the crisis. Product found to be
contaminated was destroyed. As stated by Debaere (2005), the uncertainty in the Eu-
ropean market from the taken actions “… provided an unanticipated surge of shrimp
exports to the U.S.” (p. 9).
As a result of all of these factors, exports of shrimp to the U.S.A. increased
from 740 million pounds (product weight) to 1.1 billion pounds, or by almost 50%,
during the initial period of investigation (i.e., 2000–03), and the Southeast U.S.A. de-
flated dockside price fell 40% from $2.10 per pound (headless, shell-on weight) to $1.26
per pound (figure 5). Given the depressed nature of the domestic shrimp industry (both
the harvesting and processing sectors), the USITC found in favor of the petitioners
which, in turn, led to the imposition of the duties as determined by the USDOC.
One of the distinguishing factors of this most recent investigation was the sup-
port it received from the domestic shrimp processing sector. While not universal,
many of the Southeast U.S.A. processors were supportive of the petition and ac-
tively participated in it. The reason for the increased support by the domestic
processing sector (other than breaders) reflected declining profitability in that sec-
tor. As noted, the initial increase in U.S. imports during the 1980s related to
26 Japan’s shrimp imports declined from 544 million pounds in 2000 to 535 million pounds in 2003.
27 This action resulted in an increase in the tariff rate on Thai raw shrimp exports to the E.U. from 4.5%
to 12%.Antidumping Duties and Impacts on Shrimp Trade 473
expanding culture activities in South America were primarily in a headless, shell-on
form and, hence, competed only indirectly with the larger Gulf and South Atlantic
shrimp peeling facilities.28 As exporting nations increasingly turned to value-added
processing activities (particularly peeling), however, the imported product competed
more directly with the domestic processed product resulting in a significant decline
in marketing margins among domestic producers and increased exodus from the indus-
try.29 With low or negative industry profitability since 2001, the processing industry
had no choice but to support the harvesting sector in the antidumping petition.
Issues of Relevance
As is often the outcome in anti-dumping investigations, petitioners (i.e., the domes-
tic industry) are of the opinion that final estimated duties are unrealistically low,
while the respondents (i.e., the exporters) are of the opinion that the duties are unre-
alistically high. This was certainly the situation in the shrimp antidumping case. The
duties determined in the preliminary stage of the investigation were considerably
higher than the final estimated duties, and the petitioners (i.e., the SSA) were under-
standably frustrated with the final outcome.30 As noted by Gutting (2005), average
antidumping duties have risen from about 15.5% in the early 1980s to more than
60% by 2000, an increase equal to approximately 2.5% per year, and the exporters,
by this standard, could take solace that they were able to convince the USDOC that
the preliminary margins were “wildly inflated.” Yet, the subject exporters did ques-
tion several facets of the final duty determinations. Among the most contested issues
was that of the “zeroing policy” employed by the USDOC in determining the final esti-
mated margins. In practice, zeroing eliminates negative dumping margins (i.e., those
instances where the home price is higher than the U.S. price). If zeroing is prevalent, it
can significantly inflate dumping margins. Ecuador challenged the methods used by the
USDOC to calculate antidumping duties, and the World Trade Organization (WTO) ap-
pellate board (on January 30, 2007) issued a ruling in favor of Ecuador against the
methods used by the U.S.A. to calculate shrimp antidumping duties (particularly the
practice of zeroing). The USDOC subsequently announced that antidumping duties
on shrimp from Ecuador would be terminated as of August 15, 2007.31
A second issue that has received considerable attention since the USITC final
ruling is that of continuous 100% bonding. Historically, U.S. Customs and Border
Patrol (CBP) required from U.S. importers a cash deposit equal to only a small por-
tion of expected duty liability. After facing hundreds of millions of dollars in
uncollected antidumping/countervailing duties on certain agriculture and aquacul-
ture products, the CBP determined that there was a high risk of default among
importers of aquacultured products which supported an increase in bond amounts.32
Under the new bonding criteria, every shrimp importer was required to post a bond
28 In addition, a portion of the imported product was used as input by domestic peeling establishments
on a seasonal basis when availability of domestic product was low (i.e., during the winter months).
29 As reported by Keithly et al. (2006), the number of Southeast U.S.A. shrimp processors fell from 173
in 1980 to 74 in 2004. During the decade of the 1980s, the decline was only 10% but increased to about
30% during the decade of the 1990s. Another 25% of the firms exited the industry during the five-year
period ending in 2004.
30 For example, the final estimated duties for the Brazilian firms not individually investigated equaled
about 7% compared to the announced 24% during the preliminary stage of the investigation. See Gutting
(2005) for a more complete discussion.
31 Additional details of the USDOC ruling can be found in SSA (2007a).
32 The elevated risk associated with importers of aquaculture merchandise reflects, in part, high turnover
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that would cover total projected imports (based on the previous year imports and the
potential duty liability).33 From an economic perspective, the increased bonding re-
quirements are functionally equivalent to increasing the duty rate. It was argued by
importers/exporters that this new criteria was imposed to further “control” exports
to the U.S. market (i.e., because some companies lacked access to the amount of
capital required to post the larger bonds).34 India and Thailand have both challenged
the continuous bond set out by CBP in front of the WTO. The WTO has yet to issue
its decision.
Finally, it is important to recognize that final margins, as determined by the
USDOC, are simply estimates. Administrative reviews, which can take up to a year
to complete, are initiated at the anniversary month of the dumping orders. These re-
views, which can be intrusive and expensive to exporting companies, are used to
determine the final duties that must be paid by importers during the previous year
and, depending upon information provided, can be less or greater than the estimated
margins.35 As a result, liquidation may not occur for a substantial period of time af-
ter importation of the subject merchandise, which imposes a substantial amount of
uncertainty on the importing firms.
At the request of the petitioner, the government will rescind review of indi-
vidual exporting countries. The ability of the petitioner to have these reviews
rescinded provides an incentive for to-be-reviewed exporting companies to negotiate
with the petitioner. The settlement associated with these negotiations can take a variety
of forms including a direct ‘settlement payment.’ In addition to payments being made by
exporting companies to the SSA in lieu of undergoing a review, the SSA has report-
edly used this process to obtain commitments from exporters to meet specified
sanitary conditions with respect to product being exported to the U.S. market.36
Impacts Related to the Antidumping Measures
As previously noted, much of the antidumping literature focuses on two themes: (i)
whether antidumping measures reduce imports from named countries, often referred
to as the ‘trade destruction’ effect and (ii) whether antidumping measures result in
imports from named countries being replaced by imports from non-named countries,
generally referred to as the trade diversion effect. While not considered in the literature
(to the authors’ knowledge), trade diversion can also entail more than simply a change
in trade patterns among named and non-named countries. Specifically, there can also
be trade diversion from subject merchandise to non-subject merchandise. The issues
of trade deflection and trade diversion, along with a brief examination of antidump-
ing measures on the domestic dockside price, are considered in this section.
Impacts on Named Countries
Exports from the six named countries to the U.S.A. during 1995–2006, expressed on
a product weight basis, are presented in figure 6. As indicated, after a period of rela-
33 See Gutting (February, 2005) for additional detail.
34 The term “importers/exporters” is used here because in some instances the importers are also the ex-
porters, and in other instances there have been agreements by the importers and exporters to each pay a
portion of the assessed duty.
35 Details of the administrative review process can be found in Gutting (2006).
36 One additional benefit to the SSA of suspending these reviews is a more timely liquidation of the du-
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tive stability, U.S. imports from these six countries increased rapidly from approxi-
mately 450 million pounds in 1999 to more than 800 million pounds in 2003. In
association with the filing of the anti-dumping petition, U.S. imports from the
named countries declined to approximately 700 million pounds in 2004, but by 2006
had returned to the pre-filing level.
Of interest is the fact that the initial sharp decline in imports from named coun-
tries (i.e., the 111 million pound decline between 2003 and 2004) occurred during
the period of investigation but prior to duties being imposed. When considered at
the country level, the information in figure 6 suggests that exports to the U.S.A.
from Vietnam declined by about 45 million pounds (35%) while exports from China
to the U.S.A. fell by more than 30 million pounds (18%). Other named countries ex-
periencing declines include Brazil (48 million pounds to 20.3 million pounds, or
58%) and India (10%). By comparison, Thailand’s exports to the U.S.A. remained
virtually unchanged while Ecuador’s exports increased by almost 10%.
Among the four countries exhibiting declining exports to the U.S.A. during the
period of investigation, only Brazil exhibited any significant decline in cultured
shrimp production (a decline of 20 million pounds, expressed on a headless-weight
basis). Other countries, most notably Vietnam, exhibited significant increases in cul-
tured production (Vietnam’s production, expressed on a headless weight basis
increased by approximately 60 million pounds). Similarly, exports from many of the
named countries to the E.U. and Japan increased significantly between 2003 and
2004.37 Stable or increasing cultured production in addition to increased exports to
Figure 6.  U.S. Imports (product weight) From Six Named Countries, 1995–2006
Source: USDOC (various years).
37 For example, exports from Brazil to the E.U. increased by about 20 million pounds, while exports
from China and Vietnam increased by 50 million pounds and 35 million pounds, respectively. Similarly,
exports from Vietnam to Japan advanced from 48 million pounds in 2003 to 54 million pounds in 2004.Keithly and Poudel 476
the U.S. competitors (i.e., the E.U. and Japan) suggests that there was a large ‘ha-
rassment effect’ associated with the shrimp antidumping petition and subsequent
investigation.
While the fact that 2006 exports to the U.S.A. from named countries (851 mil-
lion pounds) exceeded pre-investigation exports (i.e., 822 million pounds) might
lead to a tentative conclusion that duties had little impact on aggregate exports
among named countries, a somewhat different picture emerges when examination is
given to the individual countries in the investigation. Relatively high average esti-
mated duties, for example, were placed on subject imports from both China and
Vietnam. During the two-year period prior to the investigation (i.e., 2002–03), im-
ports from China averaged 162 million pounds and imports from Vietnam averaged
113 million pounds. By comparison, China’s exports averaged only 125 million
pounds for the two-year period following the investigation (i.e., 2005–06), while
Vietnam’s exports averaged only 88 million pounds.
On the other hand, relatively low average estimated duties were imposed on
subject merchandise from Ecuador and Thailand. Ecuador’s exports to the U.S.A.
during the two-year period after the investigation averaged 120 million pounds com-
pared to 70 million pounds for the two-year period prior to the investigation.
Similarly, exports from Thailand to the U.S.A. averaged 391 million pounds during
the two-year period after the investigation compared to 275 million pounds during
the two-year period prior to the investigation.
Brazil is somewhat unique among the six named countries in that exports from
that country to the U.S.A. all but ‘dried up’ after the investigation.38 After rapid
growth during the mid-1990s through 2002, Brazilian cultured shrimp production
peaked at 125 million pounds (headless weight) in 2003 and by 2005 had fallen to
88 million pounds. While the decline in cultured production may have resulted in a
decline in product being exported to the U.S.A., even in the absence of any final es-
timated duties, it was the combination of the two factors that culminated in Brazil,
for all intents and purposes, exiting the U.S.A. market after the investigation. Spe-
cifically, reduced cultured production resulted in a higher cost per unit output.
Given that the final duties are merely estimates, the annual review would result in a
duty significantly higher than those initially estimated.39 Aware of this situation,
Brazilian companies, by and large, simply diverted their product from the U.S. mar-
ket to the E.U. market. As such, E.U. imports of Brazilian product increased to an
average of 80 million pounds annually during the two-year period after the U.S. in-
vestigation, which reflects more than a 25% increase when compared to the 63
million pounds exported to the E.U. during the two-year period prior to the investi-
gation.40 The increased exports to the E.U. are even more impressive in light of the
fact that Brazilian cultured production fell sharply after 2003.
Based upon this discussion, one can conclude that U.S. imports from those
countries penalized with the higher dumping duties on subject merchandise did de-
cline, at least to some extent, as a result of antidumping measures. However, U.S.
imports from those countries penalized with relatively low duties (i.e., Ecuador and
Thailand) exhibited no decline after duties were imposed on subject merchandise
and, in fact, increased by a significant amount. One factor that might have contrib-
uted to the decline in subject merchandise among those countries most heavily
38 For the two years prior to the investigation, exports from Brazil to the U.S.A. averaged 44 million
pounds annually compared to only 4 million pounds annually during the two-year period after the inves-
tigation.
39 Details can be found in the Federal Register (Vol 72, No. 46), March 9, 2007.
40 To the extent that this change in trade pattern influences the European price, one can view the change
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penalized is continuous 100% bonding imposed on importers. This requirement
would increase costs to importers (by interest associated with the bond requirement)
which likely reduced the demand for imported product.
Trade Diversion Effects
(a) Trade Diversion between Named and Non-named Countries
As indicated in figure 7, U.S. imports of shrimp from non-targeted countries consis-
tently fell in the relatively narrow range of 250 million pounds to 300 million
pounds prior to the investigation. Expressed on a percentage basis, the share of total
U.S. imports from non-targeted countries fell over time from a high of 44% in 1996
to only 26% in 2003 (figure 8). Given the relatively constant U.S. imports from
these countries prior to the petition, the declining share reflects increased imports
from named countries.
With the onset of the investigation in 2004, exports from the non-named coun-
tries to the U.S.A. increased to more than 400 million pounds (figure 7) and the
share represented by the non-named countries increased to almost 40% (figure 8).
The increase in U.S. imports from non-named sources was widespread and included
many of the Asian countries not included in the investigation. For example, U.S. im-
ports from Indonesia increased from an average of 43 million pounds annually
during the two-year period prior to the investigation (i.e., 2002–03) to an average of
122 million pounds during the two-year period following the investigation (i.e.,
2005–06) and equaled 103 million pounds during the year of investigation (figure
7). Similarly, U.S. imports from Malaysia advanced from about three-million
pounds annually during the two-year period prior to the investigation to about 40
million pounds annually during the two-year period after the investigation and
Figure 7.  U.S. Imports (product weight) From Non-Named Countries, 1995–2006
Source: USDOC (various years).Keithly and Poudel 478
equaled 28 million pounds during the year of investigation (figure 7).41 Imports from
Bangladesh also showed a significant increase.
While the increase in U.S. imports from non-named countries during and after
the period of investigation is undeniable, the extent to which this increase reflects
trade diversion as opposed to, say, increased cultured shrimp production in these
non-named countries is somewhat more speculative. Reported cultured shrimp pro-
duction in Indonesia, for example, advanced from 221 million pounds (headless
weight) in the year prior to the investigation to 388 million pounds in 2005. Given
the increased production, one would anticipate increased exports to the U.S.A.,
ceteris paribus. However, while U.S. imports from Indonesia increased by almost 80
million pounds, or approximately 185%, between the two years prior to the investi-
gation and the two years following the investigation, a different picture emerges
when these figures are compared to either Japan or the E.U. For example, Japan’s
imports from Indonesia averaged 117 million pounds annually in 2002–03, but only
98 million pounds during 2005–06; a decline of 15%. Similarly, exports from Indo-
nesia to the E.U. averaged 43 million pounds annually in 2005–06 compared to 37
million pounds in 2002–03; an increase of only about 15%. Hence, U.S. growth
clearly exceeded growth in either the E.U. or Japan, providing evidence of trade di-
version.
Further evidence of trade diversion can be gleaned by comparing Japan’s shrimp
imports from targeted and non-targeted countries during the pre- and-post investiga-
tion periods and comparing the observed changes in these two countries with
observed changes in the U.S.A. During the two-year period prior to the U.S. anti-
41 There is evidence that some unknown proportion of the Indonesian imports is Chinese product which
has been transshipped through Indonesia and labeled as Indonesia product. (The CBP found $58 million
of Chinese product entering the U.S.A. in 2006 was transshipped through Indonesia and labeled as Indo-
nesia product.) Similarly, exports from China to Malaysia increased significantly during the same period
of time that Malaysian exports to the U.S.A. increased (SSA 2007b).
Figure 8.  Percentage of U.S. Shrimp Imports from Non-Named Countries, 1995–2006
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dumping investigation (i.e., 2002–03), Japan’s imports from the four Asian countries
included in the petition averaged approximately 250 million pounds annually com-
pared to about 270 million pounds during the two-year period following the
investigation. Among non-targeted Asian countries, Japan’s imports averaged 170
million pounds annually during 2002–03 compared to about 153 million pounds an-
nually during 2005–06. Hence, Japan’s imports from the targeted Asian countries
increased after the investigation, while its imports from the non-targeted countries
decreased. By comparison, U.S. imports from targeted Asian countries advanced by
about 7% for the two-year period after the investigation when compared to the two-
year period prior to the investigation, while imports from non-targeted Asian
countries more than doubled (from an average of about 85 million pounds annually
to 222 million pounds).
A similar picture emerges when the E.U. is considered. Specifically, E.U.
shrimp from Asian countries not targeted in the U.S. antidumping petition decreased
by about 15% in 2005–06 when compared to the two-year period prior to the inves-
tigation. By comparison, E.U. imports from the four targeted Asian countries more
than doubled (from an average of about 100 million pounds to almost 215 million
pounds).
While some caution should be exercised in the evaluation of changes in the E.U.
imports from targeted and non-targeted Asian sources (due to the temporary ban
placed on product coming from some of the targeted countries), the evidence, on
balance, suggests a large degree of trade diversion to the U.S. market of non-named
product for named product. This conclusion, while in general agreement with find-
ings by Prusa (1997, 2001), tends to differ from the conclusions reached of
Malhotra, Rus, and Kassam (2008) who found little trade diversion of agricultural
commodities from those countries not named in the antidumping petition.42
(b) Trade Diversion between Subject and Non-subject Merchandise
As noted, a number of shrimp products were not considered subject merchandise
and, hence, excluded from duties. Two of these products that deserve some attention
are breaded shrimp and dusted shrimp. Breaded shrimp was excluded from the scope
of investigation because domestic breaders have, historically, not depended on do-
mestic landings as a source of raw material in their processing activities. While
included in the initial investigation, dusted shrimp was excluded from the final
scope order at the discretion of the USDOC.
Prior to 2000, U.S. imports of breaded shrimp were negligible; generally less
than 1 million pounds annually. From 2000 to 2003, U.S. imports of this product in-
creased from about 4 million pounds to 19 million pounds (figure 4). This increase
suggests that imports would have continued to increase even in the absence of anti-
dumping duties. However, there is little doubt that antidumping duties accelerated
the growth of U.S. imports of breaded product. Specifically, by 2005 U.S. imports of
breaded shrimp had increased to 98 million pounds and approached the 110 million
pound mark in 2006. The overwhelming majority of increased imports of this prod-
uct are of Chinese origin which now account for about 80% of the total.
Imports of dusted shrimp, according to SSA estimates, have increased from less
42 While Malhotra, Rus, and Kassam (2008) found little trade diversion of agricultural commodities, sig-
nificant trade diversion has been reported for fishery products. For example, both Anderson (1992) and
Asche (2001) found that the imposition of anti-dumping and countervailing duties by the U.S.A. on Nor-
wegian salmon had little impact on the total supply of product entering the U.S.A. because other produc-
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than 100 thousand pounds in 2003 to more than 26 million pounds in 2006.43 Virtu-
ally all the dusted product is from China, and it is the contention of the SSA that
much of the product is imported in this form simply to circumvent duties.44
The Effect of the Antidumping Investigation on Dockside Price
As noted, the Southeast U.S.A. deflated dockside shrimp price fell by approximately
40% between 2000 and 2003 (figure 5). Since 2003, however, the deflated price has
been relatively stable. Hence, one might argue that the antidumping investigation
and subsequent duties, while not being the panacea as envisioned by the petitioners,
at least prevented any additional deterioration in price. The validity of this argu-
ment, however, needs to be tempered by the fact that there are three large import
markets for cultured shrimp products, and changes in regulations and/or macroeco-
nomic factors in any of the markets can alter trade flows and, hence, the Southeast
U.S.A. dockside shrimp price. As noted, in 2001 the E.U. imposed a temporary ban
on shrimp products originating from some of the Southeast Asian countries (i.e.,
China and Vietnam). This ban resulted in a change in trade flows with much of the
banned product being redirected to the U.S. market. As the ban was gradually re-
laxed, product that had previously been redirected to the U.S. market was
subsequently shipped to the E.U. market. In short, without a more formal analysis it
is difficult to assess whether post-2003 stability in Southeast U.S.A. dockside
shrimp price reflects: (i) effects associated with the antidumping order, (ii) changes
in regulatory and/or macroeconomic factors in the U.S.A. vis-à-vis other primary
shrimp importing countries, or (iii) some amalgam.
Concluding Remarks
While not well documented, growth in the output of cultured shrimp is undoubtedly
the result of productivity gains, and these gains have resulted in an increasing
amount of product being placed in the world trade market. Of the three primary im-
port markets for warm-water shrimp (i.e., the U.S.A., the E.U., and Japan), the
U.S.A. has the largest domestic harvesting and processing sector that would be
negatively impacted via the reduction in price.
In an effort to insulate itself from the increasing imports and continued suppres-
sion of profits, a coalition of harvesters and processors filed a petition at the end of
2003 alleging unfair trade practices by six of the major shrimp exporting countries.
The resulting investigation confirmed unfair trading and injury to the domestic in-
dustry and antidumping duties were subsequently imposed.
The analysis presented in this article suggests that antidumping duties have pro-
vided only marginal protection to the domestic industry. In some cases, estimated
duties were relatively minor (e.g., Ecuador and Thailand), and in those cases where
estimated duties were relatively high (e.g., China), exporters were, to some extent,
able to circumvent the duties by shipping non-subject merchandise. There also ap-
43 There is no harmonized tariff code for dusted shrimp.
44 As evidence, the SSA had asserted that while imports of dusted shrimp have dramatically increased
during 2003–06 “…U.S. breading production has experienced a dramatic decline during the same time
period, indicating that ‘dusted’ shrimp are not being breaded as intended. It appears that the process is
easily reversed and, as such, the product competes directly with the domestically produced shrimp in-
tended for protection under the antidumping order” (SSA 2007b).Antidumping Duties and Impacts on Shrimp Trade 481
pears to have been a large amount of trade diversion to non-named countries. These
results lead to the conclusion that productivity increases, to the extent that they will
continue, will further erode profitability in the domestic industry. This is even more
acutely the case if the “zeroing” and continuous bonding issues are resolved in favor
of the exporters.
Finally, while the antidumping duties appear to have protected the domestic
shrimp industry only marginally, the duties have provided the industry with consid-
erable funds that can be used for a variety of purposes including, but not limited to,
promotion, restructuring of the industry, and enhancing sanitary conditions of the
imported product (hence, a form of non-tariff barrier). These funds represent both
negotiated settlements to rescind reviews and Byrd monies. The extent to which the
domestic industry uses these monies in an efficient manner that will have long-term
benefits to the industry is, at this point, a matter of speculation.
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